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EUROPE AFTER AMSTERDAM
It will be recalled that the remarkable fact about the bark of the hound of
the Baskervilles was its absence.' To a certain extent the analogy can be
applied to the Amsterdam Treaty.2 Whereas much criticism of earlier treaties
has concentrated on the fact that there was rather more bark than bite, what is
most striking about the Amsterdam Treaty is the fact that there is little of
either. The central theme of this article is that, as with the informing silence
of Conan Doyle's hound, the striking absence of ambition in the Amsterdam
Treaty unwittingly says much about the present precarious state of European
integration. 3 Despite widespread acknowledgment that the European Union
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' In The Hound of the Baskervilles, Sherlock Holmes was first struck by the oddity of a
"'hound" that did not bark. See 2 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES
3 (William S. Baring-Gould ed., 1st ed. 1967).
2 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340)
1 (1997) [hereinafter Amsterdam Treaty]. The Amsterdam Treaty amended the Treaty on
European Union effectuated at Maastricht in 1992. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7,
1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. For
a consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union incorporating the Amsterdam Treaty
amendments, see Consolidated Version on the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 1 1, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 145 (1997) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU]. The Amsterdam Treaty also amended the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992]
I C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. For a consolidated version of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community incorporating the Amsterdam Treaty amendments, see
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Oct. 11, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 173 (1997) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty].
' According to one author, parts of the treaty can be described as something of a "routine
service." See Sally Langrish, The Treaty ofAmisterdam: Selected Highlights, 23 EUR. L. REV.
3, 19 (1998). For a judicious, and generally downbeat, assessment, see Jo Shaw, The Treaty of
Amsterdam: Challenges of Flexibility and Legitimacy, 4 EUR. L.J. 63 (1998). He suggests that
the inal version of the treaty "does lack a clear vision which can be 'sold' to citizens of the
Member States other than as a rather shoddy set of goods." Id. at 83.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(EU) remains beset with questions of legitimacy, the constitutional aspirations
of the Amsterdam Treaty are, at best, modest.' The temper of the Amsterdam
Treaty was set by the Reflection Group, which urged the Intergovernmental
Conference [IGC] to concentrate its attention on the need to bring the EU up
to date as a preparation for enlargement and, accordingly, to "focus on
necessary changes" rather than embark "on a complete revision" of the
Maastricht Treaty.5 The IGC readily agreed to shelve proposals for institu-
tional reform pending anticipated enlargement of the EU. 6 The Amsterdam
Treaty is generally an effort to "tidy up" the existing terms by renumbering
articles, tinkering around the edges of certain provisions, and restructuring
clauses and sub-clauses. There was little further advance because, quite
simply, no one could agree upon the direction that any advance should take.
This failure evidences a deep and debilitating malaise. A constitution and
a constitutional theory that does not take account of the political community
that constitutes it can make no claim to legitimacy that is any deeper than that
described by a bunch of rules. The treaty framework, after Amsterdam as
before, still fails to take the idea of community seriously. Despite this
pessimist prognostication, however, there are some amendments that warrant
attention. These amendments can, perhaps, provide a sense of direction for the
immediate development of European public philosophy. There are three issues
of potential interest, each of which in different ways imply that the EU no
longer expects to move either in the same direction or at the same pace. First,
there is the translation of "variable geometry" into the now statutory concept
of "flexibility."7 Flexibility is nothing if not a testament to volunteerism. 8
' For a general statement of this legitimacy crisis, see J. Weiler, Problems ofLegitinacy in
Post-1990 Europe, 46 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT 411 (1991). For a commentary in the wake of the
Amsterdam Treaty, see Shaw, supra note 3, at 82-84.
' Giorgio Maganza & Jean-Claude Piris, The Amsterdam Treaty: Overview andInstitutional
Aspects, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 32, 35 (1999).
6 For a discussion, see Duff, Supranational Institutions for Postnational Europe, in THE
TREATY OF AMSTERDAM xxx-xxxviii (A. Duff ed., 1997).
' See Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, tit. VII. The actual word "flexibility" enjoyed a
rather short shelf-life and was replaced in the final version of the Amsterdam Treaty by the
slightly less vacuous phrase "closer cooperation." See id. The term "variable geometry" had
come to describe the process by which some countries, an inner core that would include the likes
of Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, would proceed towards further political and
economic integration at a somewhat more rapid pace than the other members of the Community.
Title VII furnishes a degree of constitutional legitimacy to this process, providing a procedure
for a "vanguard group" of member states to pursue closer integration in policy areas defined
within the ambits of the first and third pillars. See id. In the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was
established upon three "pillars." The first "pillar" was described by the existing European
Community Treaty, the second by a new "pillar" on Common Foreign and Security Policy, and
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Second, there is the translation of a number of measures previously in the third
pillar into the jurisdiction of the European Community under a new title IV.9
Again, the tone of this translation betrays an acute concern for national
sensitivities. 10
A third issue, that of the Amsterdam Treaty's reinforcement of the rule of
law announced in article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), is of
potentially greater interest for our purposes. The Amsterdam Treaty reaffirms
that the "Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law."" These are
principles, it confidently announces, "which are common to the Member
States."' 12 As was the case at Maastricht, there is no attempt to further define
the concepts of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, or the rule of law.
The treaty affirms a "respect" for those rights guaranteed in the European
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms but only vests legal
authority insofar as these rights chime with "general principles of Community
law."' 3 The treaty, it is worth noting, takes the trouble to reaffirm a "respect"
for the "national identities" of the member states. 4 While there is little new
here, there is a new provision for specific sanctions to be applied against
member states adjudged by the council to be in "serious and persistent" breach
of these general principles of Community law in article 6(1)." Punishment
the third by another new "pillar" relating to Justice and Home Affairs Policy. See id. at tit. Il-VI.
' Consolidated TEU provides for any member state to veto a proposed flexibility procedure
in the first pillar if thought necessary "for important and stated reasons of national policy." See
id. tit. V, art. 23, para. 2. For commentaries on the possible application of flexibility, see Duff,
supra note 6, at 185-97; Langrish, supra note 3, at 5-7; Shaw, supra note 3, at 65-81; Amaryllis
Verhoeven, How Democratic Need European Union Members Be? Some Thoughts After
Amsterdam, 23 EUR. L. REV. 217 (1988).
9 See Consolidated EU Treaty, supra note 3, tit. VI.
0 The third "pillar" was established at the Maastricht Treaty to provide EU jurisdiction
over matters relating to Justice and Home Affairs. See Consolidated TEU, supra note 3, at tit.
VI. At Amsterdam, a range of these measures relating to asylum and immigration matters have
been brought into the first "pillar," the community, and so rendered justiciable before the
European Court of Justice. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 2, tit. IV. By establishing
"flanking measures" that are designed to strengthen the control of external borders, title IV has
been careful to balm national sensitivities. See Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 2, tit. IV,
art. 61; see also Langrish, supra note 3, at 7-12.
See Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, art. 6, para. 1.
2 See id.
' See id. art. 6, para. 2.
" See id. art. 6, para. 3.
' See id. art. 7.
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could include the suspension of treaty rights, such as voting in council. 6 Of
course, it is the rhetoric that matters. It is very unlikely that a member state
will suffer any serious loss of rights. But it is worth noting that the EU was
inclined to vest a quasi-judicial context to article F, even if it will almost
certainly prove to be vacuous.' 7
Two provisional conclusions may be drawn at this stage. First, the
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty do not promote any further integration
that can be seen to detract from the residual authority of nation-states. Second,
it must be acknowledged that the provisions of the treaty are not exciting and
were never intended to excite. It can only be surmised that such an impover-
ished aspiration says much about the lack of confidence and direction that
presently pervades the EU. At the same time, politics does not stand still; it
progresses, or it goes backward. 8 Only time will tell whether the Amsterdam
Treaty represents a step forward or a step backward, but the initial prognosis
is not encouraging. As always, much will depend upon political events over
the intervening years before the next treaty, but it can be suggested that the
painfully tentative steps made towards reinforcing the principles contained in
article 6 may just represent the most productive means towards reinvigorating
the European "project." It is to this possibility that we will now turn.
CONSTITUTION AND COMMUNITY
The Amsterdam Treaty is not particularly exciting. Certainly, it is hard to
see how it might excite the "peoples" of Europe. The reason lies with an
impoverished aspiration. The European Community has never really aspired
to realize a community-at least not in the sense of a discrete political
community that projects itself as anything more than a glorified economic
cooperative. Neither, of course, has it aspired to realize a discrete and integral
concept of "Europe." Instead, the so-called European Community has tended
to concentrate on the presumed qualities of legal integration including the
establishment of a European "constitution," more particularly, a constitution
of the type envisaged by classical liberal democracy. Such a constitution is
replete with the associated mythologies of sovereignty and right and
16 See id. art. 7, para. 2.
'7 A rationale for the sanctions clause lies in the presumed need to provide a deterrence
mechanism for new members of the Community who may periodically fall short of the
aspirations of article 6.
s As Deirdre Curtin has emphasized, there is "no option of simply stopping the clock" and
returning to the "safety and familiarity" of the old order. DEIRDRE CURTIN, POSTNATIONAL
DEMOCRACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN SEARCH OF A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 62 (1997).
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representative democracy, all of which are geared towards legitimizing the free
play of free markets.' 9 The intellectual and ethical poverty of such a
philosophy has attracted increasing criticism from more community-minded
scholars such as Michael Sandel and Francis Fukuyama. A market is not a
substitute for a political community, and the laws of such a community can
never be subsumed by the pretended "laws" of the market. This observation
has immediate and obvious pertinence to contemporary European studies. °
The stagnation that presently afflicts European integration and that is
symbolized in the Amsterdam Treaty, echoes a deeper intellectual crisis in
contemporary liberal constitutional theory. The attempt to reinvest liberal
constitutionalism has recognized the need to concentrate on the idea of the
liberal "community." In other words, a post-modem or post-metaphysical
liberalism must revise the classical liberal reliance on the traditional
mythologies, including the impoverished culture of rules and rights, and
instead recognize that any legal order is contextualized within a constitutional
and political morality. According to Ronald Dworkin, the future of liberal
political philosophy is dependent upon appreciating this deeper understanding
of constitutionalism. Law's "empire" is one secured by a relationship based
on integrity, between citizen and polity.2 ' This relationship fuses the political,
ethical, and narrative experiences of life and in doing so fashions our
imaginative "attitude" towards our constitution. "Law's attitude is" ultimately
"constructive", for "it aims, in the interpretive spirit, to lay principle over
practice to show the best route to a better future, keeping a right faith with the
past., 22 It is finally a fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are united in
community though divided in project, interest, and conviction. 23 A constitu-
tional theory that does not contemplate the political community that it
regulates can make no claim to legitimacy. Therefore, such a community can
be reduced to little more than an assemblage of rules.
'9 The author has developed this theme in IAN WARD, THE MARGINS OF EUROPEAN LAW
(1996), particularly chapter I.
20 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST 298-303, 311-13,356-62 (1995); MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3, 117, 125-27,
203-05, 274, 332-39 (1996). Sandel's insights about the American polity also ring true for the
new Europe that has a polity built more for "businessmen" than "citizens," in which "market
forces, under conditions of inequality, erode those aspects of community life that bring rich and
poor together in public places and pursuits." Id. at 332.
23 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 13 189-90 (1986).
22 Id. at 413.
23 See id. at 151-52, 167-75.
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A constitution, as the product of this imaginative attitude, is the product of
a constructive relationship between law and the evolving political morality of
the community. Moreover, such an "attitude" can only be understood in
narrative terms.24 A constitution is an aesthetic entity, an object subjectivized
by its reading public. Once the critical concession is made that a constitution
is both descriptive and constitutive of a constitutional morality, then we must
approach the idea of the political imagination, for all constitutions exist,
ultimately, in the political imagination. Dworkin is himself in no doubt that
a constitution, ultimately, exists in the imaginative "attitude" of a citizen
audience.25 The kind of liberal constitution envisaged by communitarians such
as Michael Sandel is founded upon an appreciation that the political imagina-
tion is something fashioned by the narrative formation of political identities.26
Sandel suggests that the constitution of a liberal community expresses the
"narratives by which people make sense of their condition and interpret the
common life they share., 27 Accordingly, "political deliberation is not only
about competing policies but also about competing interpretations of the
character of community, of its purposes and ends., 28 Hence, in a modem
liberal democracy it is not a matter of the periodic voting for a range of
preselected candidates, the expression of democracy enjoying an intellectual
dominion in classical liberalism, but instead about the opportunity to
participate in the political discourse that fashions a community and writes its
constitution. 9
In her recent work, Martha Nussbaum has taken the idea that a constitution
describes an imagined political morality and has applied it to the pervasive
problem of revising classical liberalism in line with the demands of the new
world order.30 According to Nussbaum, the overriding need in contemporary
society is to educate world citizens in such a way as to liberate the "mind from
the bondage of habit and custom, providing people who can function with
sensitivity and alertness as citizens of the whole world."'" Such sensitivity is
24 This inexorable logic has been acknowledged by Dworkin in his more recent work. See
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1996).
25 See DWORKINsupra note 21, at 189-90, 413; DWORKIN, supra note 24, at I- 18.
26 See SANDEL, supra note 20.
27 Id. at 350-51.
28 See id.
29 See id.
" See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CULTIVATING HUMANITY: A CLASSICAL DEFENSE OF REFORM
IN LIBERAL EDUCATION (1997).
31 Id. at ix, 8-11.
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premised uj on an appreciation of diversity, which by definition recognizes the
intrinsic integrity of each individual. The means by which this sensitivity can
be reinvested are by nurturing the "narrative imagination," which means "the
ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different
from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to
understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so.placed might
have. 32 It is the ability to identify with others that leads to the ability to
identify with a community, both in the sense of communities of selves and of
others. Identifying with a community is a democratic imperative, for the
"future of democracy" depends upon the critical faculties of an active citizenry
that can identify with the aspirations of its political morality.33 A critical
attitude expresses the truth that there is "more joy in the kind of citizenship
that questions than in the kind that simply applauds, more fascination in the
study of human beings in all their real variety and complexity than in the
zealous pursuit of superficial stereotypes, more genuine love and friendship in
the life of questioning and self-government than in submission to authority. 34
It is a vision of democracy far richer and deeper than that lamely presented in
the new article 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty.
THE POLITICS OF UTOPIA
A constitution is thus much more than an articulation of legal rights and
rules. At one level it is also a document that is descriptive of, and described
by, an immediate political morality. Further, it is also a fictive entity, the
veracity of which lies entirely upon the strength of its situation within the
political imagination of the community that it necessarily seeks to determine.
It is sometimes suggested that revisionist liberal theses, such as Nussbaum's
or Dworkin's, enjoy an immediately North American intellectual context and
are not, accordingly, suited to Europe.35 Yet the idea of a political community,
and a constitutional order as an imaginative and aesthetic expression of this
community, is rooted in European political thought. Until the political and
theological fragmentation of the sixteenth century, the respublica Christiana
of Europe was united by the Thomist sequestration of Aristotle's political
32 Id. at 84-86.
3 Id. at 94-97.
34 Id. at 84. The overarching thesis develops her earlier work where she suggested than
an ethical philosophy is constructed by the dialogic interplay of situated moral actors. See
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990).
35 See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler, The Reformation ofEuropean Constitutionalism, 35 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 97, 120 (1997).
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community.36 In a specifically English context, it is the kind of political
community that can be found in Sir John Fortescue's The Governance of
England, written in the mid-fifteenth century, or indeed in Richard Hooker's
Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, written a century later in an attempt to
cast the Elizabethan settlement in terms of a "balanced" Aristotelian polity.37
In 1517, Martin Luther pinned his 95 Theses to the door of Wittenberg
cathedral, and suddenly, as Nietzsche famously noted, there was no longer one
God, but lots of gods all attached to various godly nations.38 Before the
sixteenth century was out, the northern half of Europe had broken from Rome
and was engaged in a series of dynastic squabbles for supremacy that would
occupy the next four hundred years. The current attempt to refashion a united
European respublica must be understood in this broad context. This is a
nostalgic attempt to revisit and retrieve the unities of an imagined past, to
reach past Nietzsche's prophesy in order to disprove the haunting belief that
there is nothing, ultimately, that connects humanity-nothing that is, except
humanity itself. The idea of a legally determined European respublica, such
as the present Community, represents a denial that humanity can ever be
enough. In addition to humanity, there must be law, and it is this pivotal belief
that has geared the post-war determination to constitutionalize a legalistic
Europe.39
The threat that Luther posed to the united respublica of Europe was fully
appreciated by Sir Thomas More. Like his close friends and fellow humanists
Erasmus and Colet, More was trapped by a tension between the certainties of
the past and the inexorable progress of intellectual challenge. His Utopia40
enacted a desire to work through the alternative histories of Europe, including
the regressive history of the medieval and the progressive history of the
classical. Utopia is a famously elusive text, riddled with ambiguity. There is
an optimistic Utopia, one that might describe an idealized England or an
idealized Europe. But there is also a pessimistic Utopia, one that presents an
idyll, a rhetorical deceit designed to undercut the notion of human progress.
36 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984)
(discussing the communitarian foundations of modern European moral philosophy).
" See JOHN FORTESCUE, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND (Charles Plummer ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 1926) (1885); RICHARD HOOKER, OFTHE LAWSOF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (Arthur
Stephen McGrade ed., 1989).
38 See Ward, supra note 19, at 12-13 (discussing Nietzsche's treatment of European
history, and his prophecy that the twentieth century would be characterized by various,
ultimately futile, attempts to manufacture some sort of pretended uniformity).
31 See generally id. at 3-22.
40 See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA (Penguin 1965) (1516).
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Whig historiography has long agonized over the possible meanings of Utopia.
The tension does not need to be resolved; indeed the strength of Utopia lies in
its refusal to commit to any particular theory of humanity. The dialogic form,
most prominent in the first book and common amongst political commentators
in the Aristotelian tradition, was employed precisely so as to nourish a
dialectic rationality. The audience resolves whether Utopia is an ideal or an
idyll, for, and this was More's greatest insight, politics is an aesthetic and
41imaginative art.
The recognition that politics is indeed an imaginative art is not More's only
insight. At the same time, as a necessary consequence, More also recognized
that a political community is bound by more than law. Given More's
professional dedication to the service of the common law, Hythloday's acerbic
dismissal of the socially binding force of law is another of the great paradoxes
of Utopia. Law is a necessary evil, synonymous with an immature society
clearly unable to appreciate the immanent rationality of the common good.42
Law does not itself bind a community; rather, it provides a support for
communities that are otherwise lacking, to some degree, in political morality.
Hythloday is equally dismissive of another political concept that is sometimes
suggested to be a means of binding communities, a common market. The first
book provides an excoriating critique of communities, which not merely
permit but identify themselves with economic exploitation.43 In the absence
of an overarching theology, the ethical philosophy of the Utopians is cast in
terms of a communitarian utilitarianism. Following the Aristotelian blueprint,
the happiness of the Utopian is derived from rationally constructed moral
principles founded upon an appreciation that the good of the individual is
4' See Brendan Bradshaw, More on Utopia, 24 HIST. J. 1, 25-27 (198 1); see also PETER
ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 165-73(1998); 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 255-62 (1978) (discussing the "ideal or idyll" debate); ROBIN
WRIGHT, NATURAL LAW IN ENGLISH RENAISSANCE HISTORY 107-11 (1996).
42 See MORE, supra note 40, at 90-92, 106-07. Of course, there is an immediate ambiguity
in that the ideal described by the traveller Hythloday is immediately countered by the skepticism
of the fictive "Thomas More." A world devoid of laws, the latter comments in reply, would be
anarchy. The relative authority of the two views is intimately bound up with the alternatives of
ideal and idyll that, as we have already noted, are essentially irresolvable. See Quentin Skinner,
Sir Thomas More's "Utopia "and the Language ofRenaissance Humanism, in THE LANGUAGES
OF POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 123, 141-44 (Anthony Pagden ed., 1987).
43 See MORE, supra note 40, at 44-50, 65-70. More's immediate concerns centered on the
effect of rack-renting and enclosures, "malignant growths" which militated against a lost sense
of common good.
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determined by the good of the community. 44 A humanistic idea of a political
community is one that seeks deeper moral and aesthetic qualities than those
found merely in law or money. The prophecy of Utopia, whether or not it be
optimistic or pessimistic, is the one that was to find its later echo in Nietzsche.
More prophecized that a Europe that abandoned a proper understanding of
political morality and that merely transferred its affinities from a theological
god to a legal or monetary one, would never realize its ambition to reforge a
common respublica.
The sixteenth century reformation is instructive for a second related reason,
for, as More suspected and feared, its ultimate success was premised upon a
revolution in political identity. The English Reformation was ensured because
the seismic events in constitutional history, such as the 1533 Act in Restraint
of Appeals, were complemented by an aesthetic revolution. This revolution
was one that transformed the aesthetics of the Mass-the one event symboliz-
ing a unity of political theology- and evangelized the theological revolution.
The ultimate success of the Elizabethan settlement was founded, not upon law,
but upon an imagined sense of participation and belonging. The late sixteenth
century man and woman did indeed envisage themselves as "living in pages
of the Bible." The reformation was their reformation, effected by them, for
them, and for their children.45 In terms of zeal, commitment, and faith, the
much-vaunted "reformation" of late twentieth century pales by comparison.
The absence of a comparable European zeal is critical, and the collateral
effect is the all too familiar problem of identity. It might be suggested that the
modem European is now too sophisticated to be so easily taken in as his or her
sixteenth century forbears. But such is the argument of complacency that
perhaps justifies half-hearted attempts to establish European orchestras,
hymns, and flags, but seems unwilling to reach out and effect an image of
genuine political or social identity. The potential to be gulled by mythological
affinities transcends historical progress. The putative European is out there,
but he or she needs to feel a sense of belonging, a sense of being part of an
" The extent to which the Utopians seem content without theology, most particularly
Christian theology, has caused much comment. It is an ambiguity necessary to any attempt to
revisit an idealized Aristotelian community. See Bradshaw, supra note 41, at 7-14; WRIGHlT,
supra note 4 1, at 107-33.
45 For discussion of the critical aesthetic components of the reformation, see PATRICK
COLLINSON, THE BIRTHPANGS OF PROTESTANT ENGLAND (1988). See also EAMON DUFFY, TE
STRIPPING OF THE ALTARS: TRADITIONAL RELIGION IN ENGLAND, C. 1400-1580 (1992) (arguing
that the Reformation was an unnecessary occurrence to the average Englishman).
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irresistible progress. Europe does not enjoy a natural political existence.
Indeed, the opposite is now true. Europe is determined by its nation-states,
and if this alignment is to be tempered in the cause of an alternative European
identity, then Europe is going to have to do something of seismic proportions,
something comparable to that engineered by the reformation ideologues of the
sixteenth century. European integration will not just happen, for there is,
despite the optimistic prognostications of the end of history ideologues,
nothing certain in life except death and taxes.46
THE SEARCH FOR A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
John Kenneth Galbraith suggested that, in place of theological principle,
the aspiration of modern society is described by consumerism; the credit card
has replaced the cross. While there is certainly much wisdom in this insight,
it can also be suggested, without imposing contradiction, that the allure of
money alone will not suffice for the forging of a European identity. Nation-
states make money, and the consumer society, like. any other, is centered in
local communities. People shop down the road. This, as Galbraith suggests,
is the fallacy that lies behind radical liberal assertions that the global free
market will necessarily preserve political liberties. The free market has
nothing to do with political liberty, because a market that does not ensure
universal rights of access is free only to those who can afford to engage it.
Markets are never politically neutral, and they can never provide a means for
evading the deeper questions of what public philosophy can best reflect the
political morality of a community. Rather, the political ideology that
complements the idea of a free market merely constitutes a necessarily
secondary and impoverished supplement.47
Europe needs to offer something more than a free market. It needs to offer
something of deeper moral principle. Ultimately, Europe needs a public
philosophy. This argument has been most recently articulated .by JUrgen
46 Even commentators most readily associated with the neo-Hegelian thesis are inclined
to agree that the market represents no sort of substitute for a cohesive public philosophy. See
FUKUYAMA, supra note 20, particularly part five.
41 See JOHN GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA (1996). For a
discussion of the exclusivity that attaches to a market that does not provide rights of access, see
ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). For a recent debunking
of the myth that global markets are either free or value neutral, see Philip Alston, The Myopia
of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 435 (1997).
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Habermas, who has concentrated on the desirability of promoting public
spaces for dialogic participation.48 However, I want to suggest an alternative
that necessarily presents a more immediately ethical alternative and also
situates itself within the humanist tradition articulated by More. Two hundred
and eighty years after the composition of Utopia, in The Metaphysics of
Morals, Immanuel Kant suggested that any public philosophy must be
centered upon the capacity of the rational moral individual and the apprecia-
tion of his or her situation within a rationally constructed political
community. 49 Europe in search of a public philosophy could do no better than
turn to Kant's Metaphysics. Although Kantian legal scholarship has tended to
concentrate on a formalistic determination of right, as articulated in the first
part of the Metaphysics, the idea of right constitutes only part of a Kantian
public philosophy.5°
In the Kantian conception, a right is immanent to the rational moral self, a
concept determined in The Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals.51
However, the Kantian self exists within political communities, as Kant
acknowledged most forcefully in his discussion of the sensus communis in
sections twenty-one and forty of the Critique ofJudgeinent. He further noted
that such communities are constituted by the imagined affinity of the
dialogically engaged subjects.52 The "doctrine of right" is thus only one
component of a metaphysics of morals. Any rationally constructed community
is also grounded upon the complementary "doctrine of virtue," which is the
subject of the second part of the Metaphysics. Legal and political theorists
have tended to neglect the second "doctrine." This is a mistake because the
liberal community, for Kant, is as dependent on this doctrine as it is upon an
established idea of right. The "doctrine of virtue" describes internally
48 See Jurgen Habermas, Citizenship and National ldentity: Some Reflections on the Future
of Europe, 12 PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL 1 (1992); JUrgen Habermas, The European Nation State:
Its Achievenents and Its Limitations. On the Past and Future ofSovereignty and Citizenship,
9 RATIO JURIS 125 (1996).
49 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1797).
50 For a commentary, see IAN WARD, KANTIANISM, POSTMODERNISM AND CRITICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT 28-35 (1997).
S' IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Routledge
1964) (1785).
52 IMMANUEL KANT,THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT 151,435,443-44 (James Meredith ed.,
Oxford University Press 1991) (1790). For a discussion of the political implications of THE
CRITIQUE OF JUDGEMENT, see WARD, supra note 50, at 12-18.
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generated duties necessary for the constructive participation of the rational
actor in a political community. Incipient ideas of democracy are founded upon
these duties, just as the political concept of freedom is founded upon the idea
of immanent moral right. Furthermore, where right provides a means to a
political end, virtue describes that end as the harmonious relation of individual
and community bound by a common appreciation of a common good. It is,
ultimately, a concept of political responsibility for the democratic engagement
of free individuals in constructing a common public philosophy.5
3
The concepts listed in article 6 of the Amsterdam Treaty owe their
intellectual genesis to Kant's Metaphysics. However, their mere statement is
itself inadequate. Democracy, liberty, respect for human rights, and the rule
of law must come to mean something. Accordingly, in a Kantian thesis, none
of these ideas have political meaning outside of their application. They are
means to be applied to the ends of humanity. Democracy can be good or bad,
as can forms of liberty or rights.5 4 Article 6 can provide no reassurance here.
It does not even acknowledge the conceptual distinction between form and
substance. It is here that the timidity of the Amsterdam IGC is once again
pertinent. The refusal of the Community and its Court of Justice to "take
human rights seriously" will not be remedied by the single stroke of a
legislator's pen. This is a critical matter for the continuing failure with regard
to human rights is intimately related to the equally striking failures of
democracy." The "democratic deficit," understood in terms of inadequate
mechanisms of representative government, is not the issue. It is the absence
of an appreciation that there are alternative, wholly more suitable, forms of
democracy that could be promoted in Europe that matters. It is beyond the
scope of this article to discuss such forms in depth, but it is pertinent to note
the extensive academic commentary delving into theories of participatory
53 See KANT, supra note 52, at 181-97. For a discussion of the political capacity of the
second "doctrine," see WARD, supra note 52, at 32-35.
" See Joseph Weiler, Europe: The Case Against the Case for Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 60
(1998).
5' For the original, and telling, commentary on human rights in the Community, see Jason
Coppel & Aidan O'Neill, The European Court ofJustice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 12 LEGAL
STUD. 227-45 (1992). For the suggestion that the Amsterdam Treaty perpetuates an
impoverished attitude towards democratic rights in particular, see Verhoeven, supra note 8, at
217-33.
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democracy, both in the geo-political context of regional government and the
social contexts of workplaces and so forth.56
A deep theory of human rights, one that recognizes the integral quality of
Kant's second "doctrine," requires more than an enacted or acknowledged bill
of legal rights. Such bills are themselves resonant with the minimalism that
characterizes liberal legalism. Locke praised the Bill of Rights of 1689
precisely because it preserved his ability to exploit the semi-feudal serfs who
worked his Somerset estates. While the serfs might enjoy formal equality,
Locke readily acknowledged that in terms of political reality, his rights were
entirely distinct from theirs.57 A right is itself quite useless, but an applied
right is a very different thing. 8 An alternative post-Kantian idea of human
rights recognizes that a "respect" for others is both a civic responsibility as
well as a legal right. 9 Human rights do not begin and end in a court room,
although they barely do even that in the EU.60 Rather, they are the constructs
of a properly invested public philosophy that is itself founded on a mature
appreciation that an individual, though an end in herself, is defined by the
community that she, in turn, defines. Politics is about identity, and individuals
identify first and foremost with their immediate communities. This does not
mean that they identify with only one community. Indeed, we all identify at
different levels with all kinds of community. But we enjoy no meaningful
political existence, as Kant appreciated, without these affinities.
56 For a recent discussion of the possibilities within the sphere of social policy, see Lammy
Betten, The Democratic Deficit of Participatory Democracy in Comnunity Social Policy, 23
EUR. L. REV. 20-36 (1998).
17 See generally MATTHEW H. KRAMER, JOHN LOCKE AND THE ORIGINS OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY: PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLORATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM, COMMUNITY, AND EQUALITY
(1997) (discussing the intrinsic ambiguities in Locke's idea of a liberal community).
" See generally Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) (arguing
that the liberal theory of rights forms a major part of the cultural capital that capitalism's culture
has given us).
59 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
60 Judge Federico Mancini recently suggested that the evolution of a human rights
"jurisprudence" is now so great and human rights so "spacious and well-guarded" by the Court
that it is impossible to believe that civil rights can only exist at a national level. See G. Federico
Mancini, Europe: The Casefor Statehood, 4 EUR. L.J. 30 (1998). It is a statement that presumes
much. It implies for a start that such rights either can only be protected at a Community level
or are best protected at this level. It also implies a sense of completion. Human rights, it seems,
have been largely secured. This view is as debatable as it is complacent. It also redefines human
rights as those rights recognized by judges, which is at best an impoverished view.
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A European public philosophy can be established only by investing the
Community with a genuine sense of "community." This does not necessarily
mean diminishing the authority of nation-states, their sovereignty or their legal
jurisdiction. Community and affinity are not quantifiably discrete; there is
plenty to go around.6' But at the same time, it does mean that the Community
must deal with its citizens, not just its nation-states. The "solidarity" which
the EU proudly proclaims in article 2 of the Consolidated EC Treaty must be
one between citizens, not just "member states. '62 It must in short allow
participation. As one of Kant's most articulate twentieth century disciples
Hannah Arendt observed, people only feel a part of polity that they feel that
they have played a role in constructing.63 It is a conclusion that chimes with
that reached by another of Kant's contemporary disciples, John Rawls, whose
controversial movement from a theory of justice to a practice of political
liberalism has been determined by the need to establish firm principles of
government in a liberal community. The idea of an "overlapping consensus
describes the practical relation ofdialogically engaged citizens, sharing a loose
political morality that recognizes the overarching principle of the common
good without predetermining any necessary comprehensive ethical theory.'
The challenge, then, is clear. Further, European integration depends not
just on law. Perhaps it does not depend on law at all. Rather, it depends upon
investing a public philosophy, one that enjoys a political dynamic and an
intellectual vigor comparable to that articulated by the sixteenth century
reformers or the eighteenth century philosophers. Sadly, there is little in the
Amsterdam Treaty to suggest that this is a challenge that Europe is at all
inclined to take up, or indeed capable of so doing. Article 6 exists to tease,
suggesting that there might be a political morality "common to the Member
6 The notion that European identity, somehow miraculously achieved by means of an
enhanced idea of European citizenship, would necessarily "enfeeble national identities" is
somewhat arcane. Yet it still attracts its supporters. See Mancini, supra note 60, at 31. For the
idea that political identities are always multiple and fluid, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, MODERNITY
AND SELF-IDENTITY: SELF AND SOCIETY IN THE LATE MODERN AGE (1991); Michael Reisman,
Designing and Managing the Future of the State, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409, 418-19 (1997)
(discussing the idea of multiple affinities in the context of international order).
62 Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 2.
6' See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 195-99 (2d ed. 1998).
64 See generally RAWLS, supra note 59. The concentration on procedures of democracy
and participation bears striking similarities with Habermas' recent commentaries on the situation
in contemporary Europe. See Habermas, supra note 48, at 125.
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States" but declining to say anything more.6" Europe seems to lack confi-
dence and a willingness to flesh out, articulate this common morality and
having done so, make it mean something that can matter in the lives of real
people, notjust lawyers. What it lacks, ultimately, is anything approaching the
kind of intellectual depth or vigor that characterized either the reformation or
enlightenment revolutions. Ironically, given the anxieties that European
integration has caused, placed in the context of the last two millennia of
European history, what is most striking about the current European project is
its half-heartedness. 6 It is a community that seems almost too discrete and too
shy to transform its dreams into reality. The European "saints" identified by
Alan Milward, the likes of Monnet, Schumann, and Spaak are, after all,
pretend saints; they are saints without a theology, a faith, or indeed much of
a congregation. 67 None of them thought to describe a European Community
that was founded on any conception of human or civil rights, or anything
indeed, much greater than a free trade area. Until the crippling absence of a
proper substantive public philosophy is remedied, no amount of treaties, of
laws, or of rhetorical flights of fancy will make an iota of difference to the
lives of the overwhelming number of ordinary European citizens. More
importantly, there will be no such thing as a European "community."
THE NATION-STATE AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL INTEGRATION
Of course, perhaps this prognosis is wrong. Perhaps the new Europe does
not need a public philosophy or even a political morality. Maybe a market is
enough. The politics of pragmatism militates against any such ideality, against
images of sainthood, against imagined utopias. The age of utopias is supposed
to be past, and European legal academics are not to be distracted by such
whimsies. Yet, there is a certain ambiguity here for the idea of a united,
politically integrated Europe is precisely such a utopia.68 Treaties, even rather
61 See Consolidated TEU, supra note 2, art. 6.
66 For a related critique, see Philip AIlott, The European Community Is Not the True
European Community, 100 YALE L.J. 2485 (1991).
67 See ALAN S. MILWARD, THEEUROPEANRESCUEOFTHENATION-STATE 334-35 (1993).
68 See Serge Sur, The State between Fragmentation and Globalization, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L.
421, 426 (1997) (suggesting that the European Community is the one example of a transnational
order actually entrenching itself as an alternative to the classical model of the nation-state. It is,
he suggests, the one utopia that is more than a dream). More would have shuddered at such a
curious distinction, but the point is well taken.
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dull ones such as Amsterdam, describe aspirations and imagined futures that
are intended to excite sufficient interest that they can attract at least a
provisional acceptance. Integration is, by definition, an on-going process,
suggesting that things can, indeed, only get better. The image and the rhetoric
are absolutely critical, for there is, in reality, little else. This, ultimately, was
the irreducible tension that More appreciated. Any political vision is an
ideality, as well as an ideal. It is in part a product of the imagination, a
rhetorical feint, but in part also, an aspiration for the possible reconstitution of
society.
An imagined united Europe has been with us for 2,500 years, from Plato to
Augustine to Aquinas to More. It has continued through the likes of Hegel and
Kant and the utopias of the Enlightenment, to the rather darker variants
projected by Nietzsche, Orwell, and Trotsky.69 In The Open Society and Its
Enemies, Karl Popper warned against the over-reliance upon utopias. Central
to his thesis was the assertion that, while the modem ideologist might pretend
to scoff at such naivety, the intellectual inheritance of Plato, Hegel, and Marx
lived on, deeply ingrained in the intellectual psyche of European modernism.7°
Post-modernity, as Jean-Francois Lyotard warned, must remain vigilant
against any utopia and its pretended "metanarrative"--the mythology that
history describes a necessary progress towards the attainment of some
imagined ideal. Yet, as Lyotard fully appreciated, the dismissal of
"metanarratives" is grounded in Kant's critique of metaphysics.7 Respect for
the integrity of each individual as an end in herself demands a rejection of any
alternative comprehensive theory. The Metaphysics of Morals describes a
utopia in which there are no utopias.72
The Amsterdam Treaty, like all the treaties that periodically revisit and
attempt to describe the imagined utopia of the new Europe, must be under-
stood within this particular intellectual tradition. This tradition includes the
balance of ideal and idyll, of aspiration and skepticism. Politics rarely pursues
69 For a thought-provoking discussion of such historical traditions, concentrating
particularly on the Hegelian, see Philip Allott, The Crisis of European Constitutionalism:
Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 439 (1997).
70 See KARL RAIMUND POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITs ENEMIES 398-99 (1950)
(noting that modem intellectuals try to minimize the uncertain ties of social change by providing
a nationalist overlay to history).
71 See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (1985).
72 See KANT, supra note 49, at 36-37 (arguing there is a single practical moral system that
connects all human duties of virtue by one principle).
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pursues a consistent aspiration and never does so at a consistent pace. The
history of European legal integration, as any history, is one of fits and starts.
There can be little doubt that Amsterdam represents something of a "fit";
indeed, given the obvious trepidation that can be read into its limited
aspirations, it can be fairly said to be a catatonic one. Indeed, it may be that
future historians will see the Amsterdam Treaty as the pivotal event in the rise
and fall of the late twentieth century European vision, the diplomatic event that
signaled the turn from integration to controlled disintegration. Only time, and
a multitude of as yet unknown political contingencies, will tell.
If not a treaty of controlled disintegration, Amsterdam certainly represents
an ordered retreat from any idealized notion of a federal Europe. At the same
time, the treaty represents a consolidation of the idea of a Europe of nation-
states.73 As yet, there remains no viable alternative vision. The nation-state
remains the essential political unit in contemporary international law and
order, while the much-vaunted march of globalization represents less of a
threat than a reassurance.74 As Alan Milward has suggested, in the immediate
context of post-war Europe, the "common market" of the European
Community was created in order to secure the economic rescue of the nation-
state. 75 The Community does not possess the capacity to dislodge this
authority, and neither, given its impoverished political morality, should it seek
to do so. It has been suggested that the EU described in the Amsterdam
Treaty, the EU of "flexible" friends, confirms a new orthodoxy. This
orthodoxy recognizes that integration can only go so far as the nation-states
wish it, and, in the absence of anything other than the most superficial
democratic imperatives at Community level, this is entirely proper.76
The idea that the nation-state is somehow a threat to the ideal of a new
Europe is dependent upon a mentality entirely committed to an alternative,
indeed utopian, vision of a homogenous Europe of citizens willing and able to
abandon all received images of political identity and affinity. The most
concerted attempts to suggest an alternative political ordering have been
71 See Alan Dashwood, States in the European Union, 23 EUR. L. REv. 201-16 (1998).
74 For a persuasive presentation of this thesis, see Reisman, supra note 6 1, at 409-20. But
cf Sur, supra note 68, at 421-34. It should be noted that Sur, while generally disagreeing with
Reisman's prophesy that the nation-state is here to stay, recognizes that the relevant language
is one of transformation of the state rather than dissolution.
73 See MILWARD, supra note 67.
76 See Dashwood, supra note 73, at 213, 216.
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couched in terms of federalism." The allurement of the federal state is easy
to understand. At first blush, a federal Europe seems to suggest the possibility
of a legally defined collection of nation-states with limited sovereignty, or to
use contemporary parlance, mutually "pooled." But such an aspiration is
dependent, not just upon belief in a particular constitutional fiction of pooled
sovereignty, but on a legalistic adherence to the notion that sovereignty
actually determines a modem nation-state and that the dispersal of sovereignty
somehow diminishes that nation-state. It is for this reason that legal theorists
such as Neil MacCormick can suggest that the European Community takes us
"beyond sovereignty."78 Indeed, it does take us beyond sovereignty, but only
in the sense that it takes us beyond the fictive notion of unitary sovereignty.
In terms of exercising real power, there are always limits, limits defined and
imposed by the political imagination. Such was Machiavelli's great insight,
and it was one readily appreciated by Thomas More.79
The idea of politics "beyond" sovereignty does not of itself, then, represent
any sort of immediate threat to the nation-state. But it can take us towards a
sense of community that is not dependant upon arcane concepts of classical
liberal constitutionalism.8 ° The notion that there is such a thing as unitary
sovereignty is a fiction. As Michel Foucault emphasized, what matters is
power, and it is the efficient dispersal of power that defines the successful
modem state. Modem polities are managed not governed, and Europe is no
exception.8' Indeed, the Amsterdam Treaty is further evidence that what
matters in today's Europe is not principle or ideology but management.82 The
reinvestment of a European public philosophy will not entail a diminution of
nation-state sovereignty, but it can usefully militate against the recidivist
temptations of the more xenophobic forms of nationalism. Only once such
xenophobic fictions have been purged can nation-states be purged of their
exclusionary tendencies. Nations "without nationalism," as Julia Kristeva has
17 See, e.g., ERNEST WISTRICH, THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE (1994).
71 See Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, 56 MOD. L. REV. 1-19 (1993).
'9 For a perceptive treatment of this issue, see NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES
(Bernard Crick ed. & Leslie Walker trans., Viking 1985) (1531). For a comment on the
increasingly mythic idea of sovereignty, see Reisman, supra note 61, at 415.
'0 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183-84
(1997).
"' See Michel Foucault, Governnentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
82 Shaw rightly suggests that the treaty represents a further shift from principle to
management. See Shaw, supra note 3, at 67-68, 85; Weiler, supra note 54, at 54-55.
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persuasively argued, represent an ideal that is as realizable as the idyll of a
world without nation-states is not.83
Similarly, there is no need for a European public philosophy to set its sights
upon the destruction of the nation-state. Such a destruction is neither practical
nor desirable. Even the most committed federalist has been unable to provide
an alternative European model that is not itself dependent upon some sort of
statist model.84 Advocates of deeper political integration, such as Federico
Mancini, advance models that apply the basic constructs of the nation-state and
then reshape them in order to produce a European "state." It is for this reason
that lawyers in particular, and Mancini is again a fine example, steeped in a
belief that any community must be determined by law, assume that a European
polity must be likewise so determined. 5 But the central concepts of modern
liberal legalism, as we have already noted, are geared to the idea of the discrete
nation-state and make little sense outside that context.86 The concentration on
liberal legalistic integration in the Community is not hereby condemned per
se. But the idea that greater legal integration can itself effect a sense of
enhanced identity and affinity between citizen and Community is futile.
Liberal legalism was designed to provide the fictive legitimacy that the early
modern nation-state desired. The cosmopolitan Europe that Kant envisaged
in Perpetual Peace was, it should be admitted, fashioned by principles of
liberal legalism.87
A liberal, legal European state can be only a pale reflection of the real
thing.88 As we repeatedly have noted, the failure of Amsterdam is, ultimately,
the expression of a continuing failure of the political imagination, and there is
83 See generally JULIA KRISTEVA, NATIONS WITHOUT NATIONALISM (1993) (arguing for
the disposal of nationalism as a first step to securing the existence of a more unified and
cohesive nation); Reisman, supra note 61, at 410-11. The tenor of Kristeva's thesis received a
clear, if implied, endorsement in much of Weiler's writings. See Michael Reisman, Does Europe
Need a Constitution?: Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision, I EUR. L.J. 248
(1995). Weiler, supra note 54, at 50-51.
84 See generally WISTRICH, supra note 77.
85 See Mancini, supra note 60, at 29-42.
86 See Verhoeven, supra note 8, at 217-34.
87 See generally Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (H.
Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., 1991) (discussing sundry legal principles that peoples of the
world must adhere to in order to secure a lasting peace).
8 As Weiler has noted, with supportive commentary, "European statehood seems to many
a 'weak idea, at best irrelevant to the real problems of Europe, at worst a recipe for aggravating
them."' See Weiler, supra note 54, at 43.
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no more impoverished a model than that of a federal European state.
Moreover, in real terms, federalism does not offer any sort of alternative to the
nation-state. Federal polities, like the United States or Germany, are at least
as dependent upon imagined notions of nationalism, ethnicity and community
as are unitary states such as France or the United Kingdom. Only a resolutely
legalistic psyche, one that can convince itself that constitutional niceties alone
define the nature of a political community, can think otherwise. Nation-states
are the reality of modem international and domestic politics, and as the
German Constitutional Court revealed in its Maastricht judgment, no amount
of legalistic fiddling is itself going to change this salutary fact.8 9 The limited
constitutional aspiration of the Amsterdam Treaty is a testament to this reality.
Once again, rather than seeking to destroy the nation-state and then merely
hoping to replace it with a pale reflection, an aspiration as futile and
impoverished as it is impracticable, the far greater need is to think of ways in
which a European Community, finally vested with a discrete public
philosophy, can complement the reality of a Europe of nation-states.
The conclusion is unavoidable. Further political integration in Europe is
not dependent upon constitutional revolution or any pretended struggle for
sovereignty or perceived threat to or from the nation-states. Accordingly,
neither is further integration dependant upon law. The thought that it might
be dependent upon law has remained its greatest weakness. The European
Community and EU are hamstrung by an over-reliance on law and, more
peculiarly, by a particular obsession with observing all the mythical tropes of
liberal legalism. The sign of a strong community, as More appreciated, is the
absence of law.90 Liberal legalism has invested much intellectual energy in the
notion that a modem society is founded upon its laws and the wisdom of its
legislators and lawyers. It has been able to do so because, as an ideology, it
has presumed the existence of nation-states. These nation-states, in turn, have
been founded upon an imagined commonality between its constituent
communities and citizens. 9' Europe enjoys no such commonality. Indeed, as
Jacques Derrida has suggested repeatedly, the idea of modem Europe is
precisely the reverse, a geo-politics of nation-states, each of whose legitimacy
'9 See Case 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 Brunner v. the European Union Treaty [ 1994] I
C.M.L.R. 57 (1993).
90 See MORE, supra note 40, at 90-92, 106-07.
91 For an interesting discussion of these ideas, see ELIE KEDOURIE, NATIONALISM 56-66
(1996).
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is founded upon the establishment of some sort of imagined cultural and
political peculiarity.92
The logic is inexorable. If Europe does wish to refashion itself into
something other than a Europe of nation-states, then it first must detach itself
from the pervasive intellectual authority of liberal legalism. A European
public philosophy cannot hope to challenge the fictive constitutional affinities
that describe the relations between nation-states and citizens. It never will be
as democratic, at least in the representative sense. Its rule of law will never
enjoy the immediate impact that is enjoyed by national judiciaries. Freedom
in Europe will mean nothing if citizens are not free in their nation-states. But
Europe can reinvest in an alternative sense of community, one that is not
embedded in mythical nationalist fictions, one that does not thereby need to
identify, persecute and exclude others, one that does not find itself invested
with judicial authority in the new title lila. Such a sense, as we have already
noted, can be achieved only by turning to the fundamental principles of
political morality set in the Metaphysics of Morals; Europe must be a
community defined by mutual respect for the integrity of each individual.
It is the rhetoric of liberal legalism that directs our attention to concepts
such as sovereignty, citizenship, and rights, Much critical discussion of
European public law has concentrated on precisely these ideas in an effort to
reinvest their integrity in the new European order.93 The importance of such
endeavors should not be diminished too readily. But at the same time, they
should not be allowed to blur the important truth that the European
constitution, like any constitution, is about far more than legal rules and
jurisprudential concepts. A polity can develop only so far by such means, and
the EU has, at Amsterdam, reached the point where such a limitation is starkly
apparent. If Europe is to progress towards integration rather than regress
towards disintegration, then it now must turn its attention to the hitherto
neglected questions of its conspicuously impoverished political morality.
Article 6 must become something more than a rhetorical feint.
9' See JACQUES DERRIDA, THE OTHER HEADING: REFLECTIONS ON TODAY'S EUROPE
(1992).
9' For a recent discussion, see JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE (1999).
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